SimranLaw The Definitive Guide to Chandigarh Advocate

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But no such inadvertence can be presumed where there has been a fresh legislation on the subject and if the new Act does not deal with the matter, it may be presumed that the Legislature did not deem it fit to keep alive the liability incurred under the old Act. The accused must be, and not merely may be guilty, before a court can convict and the mental distance between may be and must be is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions; ” This line of reasoning receives support from the observations made by some of the learned Judges of this Court in their respective judgments in the case of A.

Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears.

the High Court of Punjab, in its judgment in the present case, has observed that where there is a simple repeal and the Legislature has either not given its thought to the matter of prosecuting old offenders, or a provision dealing with that question has been inadvertently omitted, section 6 of the General Clauses Act will undoubtedly be attracted. where such restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order.

We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. In agreement with this dictum of Sulaiman C. In our opinion the approach of the High Court to the question is not quite correct. These observations could not undoubtedly rank higher than mere obiter dictum for they were not at all necessary for purposes of the case, though undoubtedly they are entitled to great respect.

But when the 900 repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. Undoubtedly, it is a case of circumstantial evidence. Advocates in Chandigarh Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them.

One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The learned Judges of the Appeal Court also laid unwarranted emphasis on the words “actual delivery of possession” and contrasted actual delivery with symbolical or constructive delivery and held that only actual delivery of possession meaning thereby physical or manual delivery was within the intendment of the Ordinance. State of Maharashtra[1], a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to when in a case of circumstantial evidence charge can be said to have been established.

The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs”. Delivery has been defined Advocate in Chandigarh section 2(2) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act as meaning voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another and if nothing more was said delivery would not only include actual delivery but also symbolic or constructive delivery within the meaning of the term.

Provided a person habitually dealt in the sale or purchase of jute goods involving delivery of the goods, he-was not to be included in the ban. This construction in our opinion is too narrow. But their Lordships think that there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.

Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Even if regard be had to the mischief which was sought to be averted by the promulgation of the Ordinance, the Government intended to prevent persons who dealt in differences only and never intended to take delivery under any circumstances, from entering into the market. The use of the word “actual” Lawyer Chandigarh in section 2 (1) (b) (i) of the Ordinance was considered by the Appeal Court as indicative of the intention of the Government to include within the scope of the exemption only cases of actual delivery of possession as 1081 contrasted with symbolical or constructive delivery.

100 788 affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or ac- companied it. Five points enumerated in said case are summarized as under: – The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully Chandigarh Advocate established.

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